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In this paper we wish to investigate the role of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
both as part of the European architecture and also as an economic tool for policy co-
ordination. The Pact constrains government deficits, and this may affect the ability of 
governments to undertake discretionary action to offset shocks to individual 
economies and the European economy as a whole. There may also be a constraint on 
governments that prevents them from allowing the Automatic Stabilisers to operate. 
The Pact may also constrain government investment, and this may damage longer 
term prospects in the European Union. Not all of these considerations impinge 
immediately on policy makers, but the possibility of Germany and Portugal receiving 
admonishing letters for excessive deficits from the Commission in the recent past has 
brought the nature of the Pact to the fore in policy debates. The slowdown in 
economic activity in 2001 and 2002 is indeed the first true test of the SGP. 
We first discuss the European policy environment, and we then discuss the roles of 
rules and discretion in European fiscal policy frameworks. We discuss the 
implications of the Pact for government investment in infrastructure, and investigate 
its potential impact on medium term growth in the economy. We use our model, 
NiGEM, to undertake this analysis. We go on to discuss Automatic Stabilisers and 
their role in an economy subject to both supply and demand shocks where financial 
markets are forward looking and monetary policy makers reactive. We argue that 
stabilisers generally work but that we should not expect too much from them. We use 
OECD estimates of stabilisers, which may be regarded as the industry standard, and 
implement them within our model, NiGEM. We also use the model to investigate, 
using stochastic simulations, what the ‘safe’ deficit targets may be. 
The European Policy Framework 
The European Union has an unusual governance structure by the standards of other 
advanced economies, with responsibilities delegated to a wide range of bodies. Whilst 
the broad frameworks for monetary and fiscal policy are becoming clearer, there are a 
number of institutions that have responsibility for surveillance and co-ordination of 
the macroeconomic policy mix. The two parties in the governance structure are the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission1. 
The Council of the European Union is the Community’s legislative body. It co-
ordinates the general economic policies of the Member States and concludes, on 
behalf of the Community, international agreements between the latter and one or more 
                                                           
1 Many of the issues in this section are addressed at length in Barrell and Pain (2002). 
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States or international organisations. The Council is composed of one representative 
at ministerial level from each Member State, who is empowered to commit his 
government. Council members are politically accountable to their national 
parliaments. Meetings of the finance and economy ministers are known as ECOFIN 
which plays a central role in macroeconomic management within the EU. It has issued 
annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for Member States since 1993 and is the 
main forum for undertaking surveillance decisions of national economic policies. 
Responsibility for exchange rate policy in the Euro Area is divided between the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Council, even though the ECB has sole 
responsibility for implementing monetary policy.  
The European Commission has the right of initiative in legislation, and it submits a 
proposal to the Council. Each proposal is examined within the Council, which may 
amend it before adoption. In many cases, including the internal market, Community 
legislation is adopted jointly by the Parliament and the Council under a ‘co-decision’ 
procedure. The European Community’s budget is also approved by the European 
Parliament and by the Council. Voting procedures vary. Depending on the case, the 
Council acts by a simple majority of its members, by a qualified majority, or 
unanimously. Matters of taxation and exchange rate arrangements require unanimity.  
The European Commission is the executive body of the EU and also has an important 
role in forming overall macroeconomic policy. In most instances the Council of 
Ministers is unable to legislate unless there is a proposal from the Commission. The 
Commission has a central role in the preparation of surveillance decisions regarding 
the economic policies of Member States, and has primary responsibility for operating 
competition policy, regulating the internal market and undertaking external trade 
negotiations. The Commission has little role to play in stabilisation policy at present. 
There is a small EU budget of just over 1 per cent of GDP, which is primarily spent 
on assistance to agriculture, via the Common Agricultural Policy, and to less 
developed regions via the use of structural funds. Deficit financing is prohibited. It 
remains an open question whether the absence of fiscal federalism of the kind seen in 
the United States raises the costs from abolishing internal exchange rates within the 
Euro Area. 
The process of institution building in Europe is still under way, and there are clear 
gaps to be filled. The recognition that short-term, interventionist macroeconomic 
policies were often unproductive has influenced the construction of the new 
institutions. In particular, the decision to eschew the existence of a powerful central 
fiscal authority reflects in part this view. However, it also reflects the need to 
construct compromises between individual sovereign states. If fiscal policy is needed 
to deal with a serious problem that affects all Member States, such as a major 
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recession, then it remains available. It would be in the interests of all to use it and the 
institutions described above could ensure rapid and effective reactions to problems. 
Problems that hit individual countries should be able to be dealt with within the 
confines of the SGP, but this may need reform and clarification so that countries do 
have the ability to deal quickly with their own temporary problems. The European 
constitution is not yet written, and it may never be so, but the process of constructing 
it is under way. Significant improvements within the constraints of multiple 
sovereignty remain possible. 
The ECB has an explicit objective of ensuring medium-term price stability in the Euro 
Area. In contrast to most other central banks it has the freedom to set as well as to 
implement policy targets. This is a stronger degree of independence than in other Euro 
Area central banks in the past and than in North America and the UK. Medium-term 
price stability has been defined by the ECB to be an annual rate of (harmonised) 
consumer price inflation of between 0-2 per cent per annum. Price rises of up to 2 per 
cent may be consistent with price stability given the expected, but difficult to 
measure, improvements that can be achieved in product quality. The monetary policy 
strategy currently followed by the ECB has two broad pillars - a reference value for 
broad money growth and a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price 
developments. The reference value for annual monetary growth has been 4½ per cent 
per annum since the inception of the Euro, reflecting the medium-term target for 
inflation, plus an estimated long-term trend decline in the velocity of circulation of ½-
1% per annum and trend GDP growth of 2-2½ % per annum.  
Although monetary union has been established in Europe without a full fiscal or 
political union, there are important constraints on budgetary behaviour arising from 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The SGP extends the fiscal rules previously embodied 
in the Maastricht Treaty, although the force of the excessive debt provision has been 
diminished. It requires all the members of the Euro Area to adopt a medium-term 
objective of achieving budgets close to balance or in surplus. The Pact is underpinned 
by an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ involving surveillance and possible penalties. A 
general government budget deficit above 3 per cent of GDP is considered excessive 
unless the European Commission judges it to be temporary (likely to last for only a 
year) and there are special circumstances. Exemption is granted automatically if there 
is an annual fall in output of more than 2 per cent, an event experienced only by 
Finland and two non-participants – the UK and Sweden – in the last forty years. 
Exemption may also be granted if there is a fall in output between 0.75 and 2 per cent. 
A failure to take corrective action to deal with a deficit judged to be excessive will 
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lead to the imposition of financial sanctions2. The Amsterdam Treaty set out the 
penalties associated with the SGP, but the overall framework has been evolving since 
then. The Commission, in its Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), has set a 
target for the deficit as in balance or surplus in order to ensure that there is little 
chance of countries exceeding the 3 percent limit. This guideline does not have the 
force of Treaty, unlike the penalties for exceeding the 3 percent of GDP deficit 
barrier, and it can be interpreted by the Commission in various ways. The Council of 
Ministers, and especially ECOFIN and its sub groups for the Euro Area and its co-
ordination committees that involve central bankers and Finance Ministry officials, 
could design other fiscal guidelines for the Union and for the EMU members. These 
committees meet regularly, and they are the forum for ‘coarse tuning’ of 
macroeconomic polices within the Union. 
There are other parts to the ‘Macro-Economic Dialogue’ that are more directly 
associated with the Union’s Employment Strategy, and co-ordination of policy comes 
partly through the desire to implement similar and coherent labour market reforms 
that are designed to make the Union more flexible. The last few years have seen the 
design and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) to address employment 
in the European Union. These plans were designed in relation to agreed objectives, 
and have played a useful role in focussing efforts in areas where individual economies 
were performing worse than the Community average. The four pillars in the strategy 
that countries are expected to follow in their NAPs are: 
• Attention should be paid to improving the employability of the unemployed; 
• Serious consideration should be given to developing entrepreneurship; 
• Flexibility in companies and on the part of employees should be encouraged; 
• Policies for equal opportunities for men and women should be constructed. 
Each NAP has to offer discussion of the effects of spending and taxes on employment 
and suggest details for the implementation of specific employment oriented initiatives. 
These features have to be backed up by a sound coverage of relevant labour market 
statistics. The first three pillars are backed by clear quantitative guidelines from the 
Commission.  
                                                           
2 These would initially have a fixed component of 0.2 per cent of GDP and a variable component 
reflecting the size of the excessive deficit, with a ceiling of 0.5 per cent of GDP on the total annual 
amount. The fines would accumulate each year until the excessive deficit is eliminated. If the deficit is 
corrected within two years, the fines are refunded. 
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The Current Macro Environment and Government Budgets 
Government budgets came under considerable strain in 2001 due to the sharp 
slowdown in growth. The aggregate budget deficit for the Euro Area increased for the 
first time since serious consolidation efforts began in 1993. The Euro Area budget 
deficit was around 1¼ per cent of GDP in 2001 compared to the 0.6 per cent 
projection implied from the Stability and Growth Programmes submitted in 2000.  
Table 1. Stability and Growth Programmes Fiscal Targets  
 
 
Fiscal targets  
(% of GDP) 
Percentage point difference in 2001 
Programme and 2000 Programme 
targets  
 2001(a) 2002(b) 2003(b) 2002 2003 
Austria -0.8 0.0 0.0 - - 
Belgium 0.2 0.0 0.5 -0.3 - 
Finland 4.7 2.6 2.1 -1.8 -2.4 
France -1.0 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 
Germany -1.5 -2.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.0 
Greece 0.5 0.8 1.0 -0.7 -1.0 
Ireland 4.3 0.7 -0.5 -3.1 -5.1 
Italy -0.8 -0.5 0.0 - - 
Netherlands 0.7 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.9 
Portugal -1.1 -1.8 -1.0 -1.1 -0.7 
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
Euro Area -0.6 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 
(a) 2000 Stability Programme. (b) 2001 Stability Programme. 
As a consequence of the slowdown in activity several countries made significant 
revisions to their budget projections in updated Stability Programmes released at the 
end of 2001. Germany and Portugal have made significant downward revisions to 
their projections, and as a result their projections were discussed at Council Meetings, 
although no warning letters were issued. The aggregate budget deficit for the Euro 
Area may well remain at 1¼ per cent of GDP in 2002, with only a gradual reduction 
for 2003. 
If tax rates and expenditure plans were set to achieve an acceptable budget target 
before the recent demand shock came along then there is no good reason to change 
them. It could be that Germany, the potential recipient of a letter, could have stronger 
automatic stabilisers (i.e. more progressive taxes, more generous marginal benefits, 
etc.) than other countries and hence Germans perhaps need to adjust their automatic 
stabilisers to reduce the probability of a deficit breach. However, this possibility has 
not been widely discussed, although the evidence in Barrell and Pina (2002) and that 
given below does suggest that this might be the case.  
Discretionary Policy, the SGP and Public Sector Investment 
The policy framework in Europe has been set up to reduce the scope for discretionary 
fiscal policy, as this has often been seen as counterproductive when used in the past. 
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Fine tuning of the economy is difficult, and many of the objectives that fine tuning 
might be designed to achieve can be met with adequately designed automatic 
stabilisers, though many of the problems that fine tuning faces are also faced by these 
stabilisers. In particular, fine tuning is not particularly good at coping with supply 
shocks and in the short term economists and politicians have difficulty discerning the 
difference between an adverse supply shock and a negative demand shock. However, 
in extreme circumstances there should be scope for ‘rough tuning’ to deal with severe 
recessions. Institutions have to be strong enough to deal with these eventualities, and 
it is not clear that they presently are, as the deficit targets are perhaps too tight. We 
analyse one possible piece of rough tuning and investigate the effects of a sustained 
fiscal expansion with and without a shift in the deficit target. 
It can be argued in particular that the administrative guideline that budgets should be 
in balance or surplus is too tight, and unwise. The current targets have meant that in 
the recent past public investment in infrastructure has been a prime target for 
budgetary cuts, despite the wide evidence that such a policy might reduce the 
potential for medium-term economic growth. Public sector infrastructure investment 
can be an important source of productivity growth, and there may be periods when it 
would be wise to raise public investment well above its current levels, for instance in 
a period of rapid technical change. At these times, it could be optimal to raise 
borrowing, rather than taxes, so that the costs of the increased investment could be 
shared by the generations that would benefit from it. The SGP as it stands could 
prevent this if the extra level of investment pushed national budgets into deficit, and 
hence it is possible that the SGP and the associated surveillance procedures may 
inadvertently reduce the level of public investment in Europe if they are implemented 
to the letter. The policy debate in Europe should consider whether the fiscal 
framework should evolve towards a position where public borrowing could, over the 
cycle, be justified in relation to public investment. 
The Maastricht Treaty formulated the goal of a budget deficit of less than 3 percent of 
GDP, based in part on the golden rule of public finance that allows borrowing to 
finance productive investment. In the run up to that Treaty the public sector in the 
Euro Area as a whole had been investing as much as 3 percent of GDP in 
infrastructure, and the golden rule would allow borrowing up to this amount. 
However, the 1990s saw a marked reduction in public sector investment as part of the 
consolidation process to achieve Monetary Union. This is expected to continue as the 
SGP, with its plan for budgets in balance or surplus over the cycle, is implemented. If 
there were to be a revision to the guidelines one obvious benefit would be to allow for 
more investment. Indeed, enshrining a version of the golden rule into European 
treaties, much as in the German constitution, might be wise.  
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The decision to put further constraints on the potential for public borrowing was 
clearly wise in the early period of construction of Monetary Union in Europe. 
However, it is worth discussing alternatives to the SGP, looking in particular at the 
sustainability of public finances in the European Union and at the role of the public 
sector in strengthening the prospects for output growth. It is not clear that the SGP is 
necessarily the best framework for these objectives. There is a very strong case to be 
made for allowing the public sector to borrow over the cycle. However, it is clear that 
moving all the way to the Golden Rule would not be sustainable, and a compromise 
target could be set, say half way between the two. Looser targets still mean 
sustainable public finances, and the consolidation process has inevitably meant that 
productive expenditures have been cut to meet targets. 
We can analyse the policy choices facing Europe by undertaking a simple simulation 
on NiGEM, the National Institute Global Econometric Model (see relevant details in 
the appendix), where we increase the level of public sector investment by 1% of GDP 
from 2002q1 onward. We assume that there are no implementation problems, and that 
public sector investment is productive, and enters the national capital stock. Fiscal 
policy expansion can either be within the SGP guidelines, and thus tax financed, or 
we could have a sustained increase in borrowing of 1% of GDP. This latter policy 
initiative would shift the ‘in balance or surplus’ guideline, but we argue below that it 
would not be in breach of the Treaty obligations to stay safely within 3% of GDP 
deficits. As we can see from Chart 1, output would be noticeably higher for 4 to 6 
years, and initially the gain would be 1% of GDP, and around 0.7 percent in the first 
year. These multipliers are low because we have monetary policy rules in place that 
would raise nominal interest rates, and leakages into imports are noticeable, even at a 
European level. 
The medium term gains would be more sustained if the expenditure were financed by 
borrowing, although the initial impact on the economy would be smaller. The more 
sustained path for gains comes because taxes are not raised and consumers do not 
therefore react so quickly to the impact of higher spending on the resources they have 
available over their lifetimes. In both of these experiments we assume that financial 
markets (and consumers) are forward looking. If there is an increase in the size of the 
government sector, financed by taxation, incomes and consumption in the future must 
be lower and hence private sector net saving in Europe will fall and real interest rates 
will hence rise. As a result, even with tax finance real long term interest rates must 
rise by 0.2 to 0.3 percent, and with the ECB’s two pillar strategy this means that 
nominal rates must rise as well. Of course we assume short rates rise immediately in 
response to the increase in demand.  
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Chart 1 The Effects on Euro Area Output of a 1% of GDP Increase in 
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If the increase in spending were not tax financed the increase in deficits would imply 
that the debt stock would rise by 20% of GDP in the longer term. This would mean 
that real (and hence nominal) interest rates would rise by more in future, and hence 
real long term rates would rise by 0.3 to 0.35 percent now. Hence debt finance would 
reduce both the immediate impact effects and the longer-term impact on output.  
Decomposing Stabilisation Gains 
Considerable attention has been paid to the scope for the use of fiscal policy as a 
stabilisation tool under the SGP. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), Dalsgaard and De 
Serres (1999) and Buti et al. (1998) have discussed whether there will still be room 
for automatic stabilisers. The latter authors argue that a fiscal position close to balance 
or in surplus means that automatic stabilisers will be restored. However, it is widely 
accepted that while countries are still close to the 3 per cent threshold a potential 
incompatibility between built-in stabilisers and the SGP exists (e.g. Eichengreen, 
1997). It is also of interest to quantify how effective automatic stabilisers are at 
smoothing output. Studies like Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), European 
Commission (1997) and Allsopp et al. (1997) are based on a very limited number of 
deterministic simulations, mainly consisting of demand shocks, which excludes many 
other sources of uncertainty, unlike the stochastic and other simulations reported in 
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Barrell and Pina (2002) and Barrell and Dury (2001)3. As Blanchard (2000) suggests, 
concentrating on demand shocks may bias the results towards large stabilisation gains 
(smaller output gaps). In this section we extend this analysis by analysing the role of 
automatic stabilisers under different sorts of shocks using NiGEM.  
For each of the EMU countries analysed in this paper, fiscal revenues can be 
disaggregated into personal income taxes plus social security contributions (TAX), 
corporate taxes (CTAX) and miscellaneous taxes (mainly indirect; MTAX). 
Expenditures comprise government consumption and investment (GC and GI), 
interest payments (GIP) and transfers (TRAN). The budget balance thus reads:  
BUD = TAX + MTAX + CTAX  - TRAN - GIP - GC – GI    (1) 
Government interest payments are modelled as the income on a perpetual inventory, 
the change in the debt stock each period paying the long interest rate in the issue 
period until it is replaced4. Variables GC and GI are not cyclically sensitive, unlike 
transfers and revenues (see below). Personal taxes and transfers affect disposable 
income, as do interest payments5. Further, all budget items feed into the economic 
system through their impact on the budget balance, and thus on the economy’s asset 
stocks. 
The results in this section follow from those in Barrell and Pina (2002), where a more 
complete analysis of the role of Automatic Stabilisers can be found along with their 
implications for deficit breaches under the SGP. Barrell and Pina follow the OECD, 
and other international organisations that calculate structural fiscal positions, in 
modelling automatic fiscal stabilisation – both in defining which revenue and 
expenditure items are assumed to depend on the cycle, and in quantifying such 
dependence. They assume that tax revenues respond to the economy’s cyclical 
position, whilst on the expenditure side only unemployment benefits do so. Further, 
each cycle-dependent budget item displays a given, nationally distinct constant 
elasticity with respect to the output gap6. In order to evaluate stabilisers two policy 
regimes are simulated: one where taxes and unemployment transfers are determined 
according to OECD elasticities, the other where taxes and spending plans are set at 
                                                           
3 Another paper on automatic stabilisers is Van den Noord (2000). However, it is not clear what 
method this author uses to draw shocks and apply them, and hence we feel it is difficult for us to 
compare our results with his. 
4  The perpetual inventory attempts to take account of countries like Italy and Belgium where there are 
large proportions of short-term public debt. Our simple model cannot take account of the complexities 
of debt finance, and there are residuals on these equations, and these are used in stochastics. 
5  Variable GIP also influences net property income paid abroad, and thus the current account and asset 
stocks as well. 
6  See Giorno et al. (1995, pp. 203-208) for a summary of how such elasticities have been estimated. 
The analysis in Barrell and Pina (2002) was begun before the publication of new elasticities in Van den 
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their structural trajectory levels, and there are no fiscal feedback mechanisms 
operating to stabilise the economy. 
Automatic stabilisers alone cannot account for fiscal behaviour over the cycle, since 
political and bureaucratic factors also play a role (see Melitz, 1997). It is also true that 
elasticities are endogenous, at least in the medium term. However, it is useful to 
assess, in the light of the existing elasticity estimates and abstracting from political 
biases, how effectively European tax and transfer systems smooth output fluctuations. 
First, even if such systems proved incompatible with SGP rules and a reform of 
taxation and unemployment benefits ensued, any accompanying increase in output 
volatility would be a loss in itself, whose quantification provides one possible 
rationale for our approach. Furthermore, the conventional view of automatic 
stabilisers continues to be found in recent studies on European fiscal policy (e.g. Buti 
et al. (1998), Artis and Buti (2000)). 
An attractive feature of the conventional view of automatic stabilisers is that it can be 
expressed as a set of ‘simple rules’ for the relevant budget instruments - thus making 
it possible to perform a formal analysis of the ensuing policy regime in the dynamic, 
rational expectations framework of NiGEM. Following the OECD ensures that our 
results are comparable to previous research by other authors (discussed above). For a 
given item with (nominal) value T, the OECD determines the corresponding structural 












        (2) 
where Y* represents potential output, Y actual output and α is thus an elasticity with 
respect to the output gap. The OECD cyclically adjusts five budget categories: 
personal income tax, social security contributions, indirect taxes, corporate taxes and 
current primary expenditure. The elasticity applied to the latter is typically small, 
reflecting the circumstance that unemployment benefits are the only expenditure item 
assumed to vary automatically with the cycle. Our objective in using these values is 
not the same as the OECD’s. They compute the s ructural values of budget items for 
given actual amounts, we aim at obtaining actual taxes and expenditure that, although 
varying across stochastic trials, correspond to a given unchanged structural stance. 
They thus reflect the operation of automatic stabilisers in the wake of a variety of 
shocks and in the absence of discretionary fiscal policy measures. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Noord (2000). However, these new elasticities make no real difference to results, as we explain below. 
Further, backtracking to use these elasticities would reduce comparability with previous studies. 
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Table 2. The Impact of Automatic Stabilisers – A Demand Shock 
 Demand Shock in 
backward mode 
Demand Shock in 
forward mode 
 1999q1 - 2017q1 1999q1 - 2017q1 
Germany 0.796 0.847 
France 0.929 0.910 
Italy 0.899 0.974 
Netherlands 0.893 0.916 
Belgium 0.902 0.938 
Spain 0.795 0.776 
Portugal 0.868 0.915 
Austria 0.848 0.899 
Ireland 0.925 0.922 
Finland 0.881 0.896 
Euro Area 0.860 0.890 
The backward shock is run with fixed interest rates and exchange rates and no rational 
expectations. We implement a large shock to US consumption with and without automatic 
stabilisers. 
The forward shock is run with the two pillar strategy in place and forward looking 
financial and exchange markets, as well as forward looking labour markets. We implement 
the same large shock to US consumption with and without automatic stabilisers. 
It is common to evaluate automatic stabilisers in terms of their ability to stabilise the 
economy in response to a single shock. We can do so for a simple demand shock such 
as a fall in US demand, starting the simulation in 1999q1 and evaluating the role of 
policy and expectations in stabilising the economy. We apply the same shock in 
backward mode and forward mode, as explained in Table 2. Our run in forward-
looking mode assumes that individuals form model consistent expectations and that 
EMU was in place. In each case we also run the model without automatic stabilisers, 
and calculate the gain in terms of the root-mean-squared deviation (RMSD) of output 
from baseline with stabilisers and without them. The ratios of these RMSDs  (‘with’ 
over ‘without’) are reported in Table 2 both for the Euro Area as a whole and for 
individual economies. Clearly, in the face of demand shocks automatic stabilisers 
produce a more stable outcome. Stabilisation gains appear to be significant, especially 
if we assume no response by financial markets and the monetary authorities. The Euro 
Area as a whole has an RMSD of output that is 14% better when there are stabilisers 
in place than when there are not. Germany and Spain particularly benefit from the 
presence of these feedbacks. However, if we let the monetary authorities absorb some 
of the shock7 then roughly a fifth of the gain is removed. If the shock is negative, as it 
is here, short-term interest rates will be cut both now and in the future, and as a result 
                                                           
7 This has not been common in the other studies discussed above, and hence they have given more 
weight to the role of fiscal stabilisers than we think is reasonable. Van den Noord (2000) uses a Taylor 
rule, but has fixed exchange rates, and hence he has only moved half the distance between column 1 
and column 2 of Table 2. 
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forward looking long term rates will go down as well, and both of these will help 
stabilise the economy. 
Table 3. The Impact of Automatic Stabilisers – All Shocks from 1993q1   
 1999q1 - 2017q1 1999q1 - 2005q4 
Germany 0.822 0.879 
France 0.946 0.979 
Italy 0.924 0.841 
Netherlands 0.993 1.049 
Belgium 0.967 0.967 
Spain 0.785 0.841 
Portugal 0.929 0.954 
Austria 0.949 1.004 
Ireland 0.985 1.042 
Finland 1.004 1.059 
Euro Area 0.892 0.912 
The full range of shocks to all equations from 1993q1 is applied to the model with and without 
automatic stabilisers. The model is run with the two pillar strategy in place and forward looking 
financial and exchange markets, as well as forward looking labour markets.  
 
The evaluation of the stabilising properties of the feedbacks depends upon the time 
horizon considered and the complexity of the shocks. We can apply all the shocks that 
occurred in 1993q1, for instance, to our model. As shown in Table 3 (first column), 
over the 19 years of our run the automatic regime is stabilising for almost all 
countries, with it producing no discernible impact for Finland, which was subject to 
severe supply shocks around 1993. Over the first seven years (equivalent to the results 
normally published in other studies) the automatic stabilisers regime is stabilising for 
some countries but not for others (second column of Table 3). Over this period, as we 
might expect, automatic stabilisers are less effective in the small open economies. The 
Euro Area as a whole makes a stabilisation gain of 9 percent, marginally below the 11 
percent reported in Barrell and Pina (2002) for repeated trials drawn from 1993q1 to 
1997q4. 
It is useful to compare the elasticities utilised in Barrell and Pina (2002) and other 
studies with those used in van den Noord (2000). For most economies there is little 
impact when we change elasticities (see Table 4). The impact on the RMSD of output 
as compared to the no-stabilisers case changes by less than 1 percent for Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Belgium and France, and just above 1 percent for Finland and the 
Netherlands. These differences will produce very little impact on our conclusions. The 
slightly larger increase in the value of stabilisers in Austria would not impact greatly 
on our results. Only in Germany and Italy, at least in the short run, do the stabilisers 
change noticeably. The major changes in most countries come from a remodelling of 
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the corporate tax regime, removing the lag in payments discussed in Barrell and Pina 
(2002). However, corporate tax receipts are generally so small that they have little 
impact on the overall effect of the regime. Changes in personal tax regimes in 
Germany, and to a lesser extent in Italy, decreased the scale of the stabilisers 
somewhat. 
Table 4. Ratios of new OECD stabilisers to old OECD stabilisers 
 First Seven Years 1999q1 - 2017q1 
Germany 1.0396 1.0401 
France 1.0014 1.0013 
Italy 1.0554 1.0170 
Netherlands 1.0118 1.0118 
Belgium 1.0051 1.0051 
Spain 0.9997 1.0000 
Portugal 1.0019 1.0013 
Austria 0.9836 0.9836 
Ireland 0.9996 0.9997 
Finland 1.0195 1.0118 
Calculated using the NiGEM model from Barrell and Pina (2002), applying the 1993q1 shock, and then 
repeating the exercise with the Van den Noord (2000) elasticities. Results are ratios of RMSD of 
output. 
Setting the Deficit Target 
Barrell and Dury (2001) present extensive results on fiscal issues and also discuss the 
recent literature on the appropriate targets for government budget deficits. Some 
simple descriptive statistical analyses have been undertaken based on retrospective 
evidence. The work in Buti and Sapir (1998), for instance, broadly suggests that the 
European economies could operate well within the SGP guidelines if they broadly 
followed a balanced budget target and if some, such as the Nordic economies, aimed 
for a surplus. These results depend on the observed volatilities of both the economies 
in question and their budget deficits and they probably paint too pessimistic a view of 
the constraints governments face. In particular, the Nordic economies exhibited 
volatile business cycles in the 1970s and 1980s into the early 1990s because they went 
through a sequence of devaluation induced booms and downturns. These are no longer 
possible to generate in quite the same idiosyncratic way given monetary policy 
commitments in Finland, Denmark and Sweden. 
We investigated this issue in a number of papers using stochastic simulations on 
NiGEM (see Barrell and Dury (2001), Barrell and Pina (2002) and Dury and Pina 
(2000))8. The probabilities of breaching the SGP were calculated and in all three 
papers the conclusion was that the targets for the government deficit announced in the 
                                                           
8 Barrell, Dury and Hurst (2002) discuss the basis of the technique used, and readers are referred to that 
for further discussion of bootstrapping a forward looking model. 
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stability programmes were broadly compatible with the automatic stabilisers working 
freely and that the structure in place could cope well in stabilising the economy given 
a variety of shocks. Clearly, the closer to zero the target deficit, the easier it would be 
for fiscal stabilisers to work. 







Germany 1.73 1.59 1.53 
France 2.28 2.14 2.11 
Italy 1.97 1.71 1.72 
Netherlands 1.85 1.73 1.59 
Belgium 0.47 0.46 -0.03 
Spain 1.41 1.48 1.33 
Portugal 2.31 2.25 2.25 
Austria 1.42 1.44 1.30 
Ireland 1.12 0.96 1.05 
Finland 1.22 1.10 1.24 
 
In Barrell and Dury (2001) we calculate the target deficit required for there to be only 
a 1 per cent chance of exceeding the SGP 3 per cent ceiling. The stochastic 
simulations give us the variability of the government budget ratio and from this we 
can calculate the required mean target for each country. Table 5 presents these results. 
We show that the level of the government budget deficit required for a 1 per cent 
chance of exceeding the 3 per cent limit without constraining the automatic stabilisers 
built into the model9 is relatively high compared with most other estimates, as 
discussed by Buti and Martinot (2000). For example, an econometric analysis by 
Dalsgaard and de Serres (1999) reports appropriate medium-term target deficits of the 
order of 1–1.5 per cent of GDP for the majority of the European economies. Finland, 
UK, Denmark and Sweden are estimated to require moderate surpluses to keep within 
the SGP criteria. Our results suggest that the main European economies can run looser 
deficit targets. 
Our stochastic simulation results have the advantage of being based on a model of the 
European economies that we think will exist in the future with a policy environment 
that is a reasonable idealised description of the current framework. They should 
therefore be reasonably robust to the criticism of not taking account of structural 
changes in the economy and in policy regimes, whilst those based on historical 
outturns are riddled with such problems. Our results in Table 5 suggest that amongst 
the initial EMU members only Belgium needs to run near balanced budgets to allow 
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the automatic stabilisers on our model to operate without breaching the 3 per cent of 
GDP deficit limit. We show the results over a number of types of monetary policy 
rules, and these are discussed further in Barrell and Dury (2001). In that paper it is 
shown that the core Euro Area economies would require tighter deficit target 
trajectories if the ECB were targeting an inflation rate as this strategy increases 
interest rate volatility and hence the volatility of government debt interest payments. 
Setting target deficits ‘close to balance’, as in the Pact, can be seen as aiming for a 
target range of 0–1 per cent of GDP. This is tighter than the ‘safe’ budget targets 
shown in Table 5. There are three possible effects of the economic cycle on the 
budget, in that tax revenues automatically rise with incomes and expenditures on 
items such as unemployment insurance automatically fall, and also as revenues 
improve there are political pressures to lean with the wind and cut taxes and raise 
spending. The first two are best described as automatic stabilisers. NiGEM has effects 
of the cycle on unemployment related transfers similar to those in van den Noord 
(2000), but probably has smaller cycle related tax elasticities. Barrell and Pina (2002) 
embed the ‘industry standard’ tax elasticities into the model and show that the 
volatility of the deficit increases somewhat, but not enough to make target deficits in 
the range of 0–1 per cent of GDP induce more than the very occasional breach of the 
SGP. There is clear scope within the current arrangements for the unfettered operation 
of automatic stabilisers. However, there are good reasons to be cautious and set target 
deficits closer to zero than those in Table 5. The ‘close to balance’ rule can also be 
seen as being designed to offset some of the potential bias introduced into the 
budgetary system by bureaucratic offsets discussed, for instance, in Mélitz (1997). We 
would presume, as in the 1980s and 1990s, governments will find it difficult to run 
surpluses even when they are appropriate to the cyclical position. We would conclude 
that deficits around 1 per cent of GDP would be suitable for almost all countries in 
EMU. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that there might be a case for changing the deficit target 
within the SGP, making it possible to increase public investment. If targets were set at 
1 percent of GDP then the 3 percent ceiling would be unlikely to be breached. We 
have also shown that automatic stabilisers can be expected to work, but in the face of 
supply shocks we cannot expect too much from them.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
9 These stabilisers differ in detail from the industry standard as used in Barrell and Pina (2002), but the 
differences are small and they do not affect the essential message of these results. 
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Appendix – the Structure of NiGEM 
NiGEM is an estimated quarterly macroeconometric model using a ‘New-Keynesian’ 
approach. Agents are forward-looking in financial and labour markets, but the process 
of adjustment to shocks is slowed down by nominal rigidities. Demand and supply 
sides are fully modelled, alongside an extensive monetary and financial sector. The 
model comprises estimated blocks for the whole world: all OECD countries are 
modelled separately, and there are 8 non-OECD groups. The major economies have 
fairly detailed models (60-90 equations, with around 20 key behavioural relations) 
sharing a similar theoretical structure, so that cross-country variation in simulation 
properties reflects genuine differences resulting from estimation. National or regional 
blocks are linked through trade, financial variables and asset stocks. 
The core structure of NiGEM can be viewed as Dornbusch-Mundell-Fleming model 
with forward-looking variables. The short run simulation properties are discussed in 
Barrell, Dury, Hurst and Pain (2001) and longer term issues in Barrell, Dury and 
Holland (2001). Consumption on the model can be either forward or backward 
looking and it depends on income and (forward-looking) wealth, which entails the 
need to ensure that the assets stocks of the private and public sectors are modelled 
consistently within and across countries. Solvency constraints are imposed on 
governments, thus ruling out any long-run explosion in public debt stocks. Financial 
markets are forward-looking. Exchange rates follow the uncovered interest parity 
condition, while long term interest rates result from the forward convolution over 10 
years of their 3-month counterparts. The latter are assumed to be the monetary 
authorities’ instrument, set according to simple feedback rules. The impact of future 
events is brought forward onto households by financial markets through variables 
such as long rates and equity prices.  
As regards the supply side, estimated demands for capital and labour form a basis to 
calibrate aggregate CES production functions with exogenous labour-augmenting 
technical progress. Capacity utilisation based on the production function feeds into the 
wage and price system, playing an essential role in the model’s self-stabilising 
properties. Different institutions in the labour and product markets make the estimated 
speed of adjustment of wages and prices vary across countries. In most countries 
evidence supports the existence of forward-looking behaviour in bargaining, and 
wages depend on expected future inflation. Although there are differences between 
labour markets, these can be justified on statistical grounds, as Barrell and Dury 
(2000) show, and there is little difference between the reactions of a world where all 
are assumed to be the same and one where they are not. 
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